This study explores the elusive social dimension of quantitative finance. We conducted three years of observations in the derivatives trading room of a major investment bank. We found that traders use models to translate stock prices into estimates of what their rivals think. Traders use these estimates to look out for possible errors in their own models. We found that this practice, reflexive modeling, enhances returns by turning prices into a vehicle for distributed cognition. But it also induces a dangerous form of cognitive interdependence: when enough traders overlook a key issue, their positions give misplaced reassurance to those traders that think similarly, disrupting their reflexive processes. In cases lacking diversity, dissonance thus gives way to resonance. Our analysis demonstrates how practices born in caution can lead to overconfidence and collective failure. We contribute to economic sociology by developing a socio-technical account that grapples with the new forms of sociality introduced by financial modelsdissembedded yet entangled; anonymous yet collective; impersonal yet, nevertheless, emphatically social.
INTRODUCTION
As the term "financial engineer" suggests, the recent history of finance is part of the broader rise in systems engineering over the last half of the 20 th Century. Models, computers, and electronics have reshaped Wall Street as much as the jet engine changed aviation. Whether in industrial engineering or in financial engineering, the new tools of practice have proven faster, bolder, and more complex, opening up the scope for gains in speed, efficiency, and power. But they have also opened up the possibility of disasters. Indeed, it is no coincidence that a new body of expertise, cybernetics, was developed to deal with the complexities of advanced technological systems in the age of machine intelligence. Writing in the aftermath of one of the most automated (and lethal) wars to date, Weiner (1948) , McCulloch & Pitts (1943) and Von Foerster (1958) laid out the principles for the governance of systems marked by interdependencies and positive feedback. But whereas these concerns arguably helped system engineers limit (though not eliminate) the dangers of nuclear accidents or massive air traffic fatalities, the equivalent has not yet been developed for financial engineering. "Systemic risk," "circuit breakers," and related expressions populate the day-to-day parlance of regulators, but existing theories of the market do not explicitly focus on the interdependencies caused by financial modeling. Positive feedback, tight coupling, or lock-in hang menacingly over the portfolios of investors. As the credit crisis of 2008 comes to show, the large technological systems at the core of the industrial economy may be better prepared for the risks of complex engineering than modern finance.
We explore the aforementioned risks to market stability by examining the social use of financial models. How are spreadsheets and equations deployed in banks and hedge funds? Do models replace, complement or fundamentally alter the ways in which traders rely on their judgment and social cues? What happens to a network when social interaction is mediated by an artifact such as a model? Following the methodology of the emerging literature in the social studies of finance (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003; Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2002; Beunza & Stark, 2004; Preda, 2006) we conducted a three-year ethnographic study of the daily operations of the trading room of a major international investment bank, pseudonymous "International Securities." Our focus was its merger arbitrage desk, a team involved in a well-publicized arbitrage disaster in 2001. In this study we combine the findings of our detailed ethnographic observations with a historical reconstruction of the arbitrage disaster in question. Merger arbitrage is a particularly appropriate setting because it is also free from the self-referential loops and "beauty contests" outlined by Keynes (1936) , as merger completion is a decision taken by the companies with relative independence of the bets placed by the arbitrageurs (more on this below).
Our findings point to the existence of a new socio-technical mechanism that results from the use of financial models. Arbitrageurs, we found, do not only use models to develop their own estimates of relevant variables. Crucially, they also deploy models to check their own estimates against those of their rivals. Thus, in place of models versus social cues, we observed traders modeling social cues. We refer to this practice as reflexive modeling. This procedure, known as "backing out," among finance practitioners, is at the center of the use of models in quantitative finance and was rated by Chester Spatt, recent Chief Economist at the Securities and Exchange Commission, as the second most important financial innovation of the past four decades, alongside with Black-Scholes (interview conducted by the authors).
Our study further demonstrates that these precautionary practices can also be dangerous. Reflexive modeling creates a form of cognitive interdependence that can amplify mistakes. When a sufficiently large number of arbitrageurs overlook a critical factor driving merger failure, the dissonance that is at the core of reflexive modeling turns to resonance. It is this resonance that creates misplaced confidence, leading to widespread and oversized losses. The occurrence of such losses has been well documented in the academic finance literature, and is referred to as "arbitrage disasters" (Officer, 2007) . An arbitrage disaster is specific to merger arbitrage, as is defined as "deal failures that cause merger arbitrageurs worst-loss day exceeding $500 million" Officer (1997:12) .
Our analysis contributes to economic sociology by outlining the contours of the new sociability ushered in by quantitative finance. As repeatedly described by scholars of finance (e.g., MacKenzie, 2006; Knorr-Cetina, 2005) , the introduction of financial models and electronic markets has been described as a replacement of personal networks with anonymous transactions, and social capital with human capital. However, the existence of reflexive modeling demonstrates that quantitative traders have not actually replaced social cues with financial models. Instead, traders use models as an instrument to observe and measure social cues. As a result, the dysfunctions of an overembedded financial market -herding, self-fulfilling prophecies--are now less prominent. But new risks such as resonance have developed in their place.
UNDERSTANDING INTERDEPENDENCE IN QUANTITATIVE FINANCE
How is quantitative finance a social endeavor? The current debate has emphasized either the social or the technical aspects of the capital markets, but failed to take both simultaneously into consideration. Our review below examines the various approaches to "the social" in behavioral finance, economic sociology, and science and technology studies. The conclusion emerging from it is that grappling with modern markets calls for an understanding of the novel forms of economic engagement introduced by financial models. We characterize these as a form of cognitive interdependence, created by the distributed cognition that is afforded by financial models.
Behavioral finance and the need for a socio-technical account
The challenges involved in characterizing quantitative finance are aptly illustrated by the limitations of existing behavioral approaches to risk. These shortcomings are clear in "Black Swan" accounts that attribute financial crises to the overuse of financial models. Building on the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty, several authors have argued that crises occur when the unquestioned use of financial models leads banks to underestimate uncertainty (Taleb, 2007; Derman, 2004; Bookstaber, 2007) . The models used by these investors, the argument goes, assume a future that is an extrapolation of the past. Investors assume, for instance, that stock returns follow a Normal distribution --but in practice financial markets are subject to unpredictable extreme events, or Black Swans. Instead of a Normal distribution, stock returns are more accurately described by fat-tailed distributions. To the extent that investors do not incorporate these exceptions into their models, their trading will be subject to the risk of disaster.
Although appealing, the Black Swan is ultimately an under-socialized explanation of the risks created by models. The Black Swan presents financial actors as hopelessly unreflexive about the limitations of their models. Confronted by uncertainty about the model, we would expect market actors to rely on the social cues around them -which brings us back to the question of how actors combine the social and the technological.
In contrast to this, another stream of behavioral literature has explained financial risk in terms of imitation among financial actors (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990 ; see also Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992 on information cascades). In the seminal account by Scharfstein & Stein (1990) herding takes place when actors have an incentive to mimic the actions of others, even if their private knowledge would dictate doing otherwise. This typically takes place in situations that couple uncertainty with an overly comparative reward structure. Consider, for example, two salespeople who are to choose whether to sell wine in the East or West end of a city. There is uncertainty as to how much demand there is in both ends, and each of them has some private information about it. If the salespeople are paid a straight commission on their sales, each of them will choose whichever side of town they think will have greater demand. Consider now what happens if they are paid according to a comparative scheme, in which agent one chooses first and agent two's bonus is based on how much she sells over or below agent one. If that is the case, it will be in the best interest of agent two to simply follow salesman one's decision, even if her private information suggests that demand is greater on the other side of town. Doing so avoids the worst possible outcome, namely, one in which the first agent is lucky and the second one is not. As Keynes puts it, "wordly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to fail unconventionally" (Keynes, 1936: 158) . Mechanisms of "social proof" such as this have been used to explain financial risks and the dynamics of financial bubbles (Shiller 1984; Smith, Suchanek, and Williams 1988) . A related model of imitation is given by studies of information cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992) .
Cascades and herding, however, do not account for the existence of technology in the decision-making process. In the classic account of herding described above, actors do not change their opinion but simply disregard it for the sake of conforming to the actions of others. Beliefs are replaced rather than combined, with actors metaphorically disconnecting their brains to act according to the dictates of the mass. Admittedly, this might have been a realistic portrayal of financial actors before the 1980s, when decisionmaking was primarily embedded and institutionalized (Abolafia, 1988; Baker, 1984) . But the introduction of computers, equations and models into financial markets during the past three decades has also changed the attitudes and procedures in the trading rooms (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003; Beunza & Stark, 2004) . For instance, trading with a model is not the same as trading without one: it entails handling and manipulating a body of codified knowledge that cannot simply be put to the side for the sake of copying someone else's decision -at least, not without fundamentally abandoning the trading strategy.
Economic sociology and the problem of anonymity
The dominant paradigm in economic sociology is equally unprepared to grapple with the technological aspect of quantitative finance. Economic sociologists have traditionally presented market activity as social by emphasizing that transactions are embedded in social ties (Granovetter, 1985 , Baker, 1984 . But the notion of embeddedness --developed before the full impact of the quantitative revolution on Wall Street--needs to be reconsidered in settings where networks of people have been augmented by sociotechnical networks, including connections, computers and financial models. Whereas embeddedness presupposes the existence of personal acquaintance among social actors, current financial Reflexive modeling offers important benefit to individual funds. It gives individual participants a way to leverage the cognitive efforts of their rivals. In that sense, reflexive modeling suggests that the price mechanism is not only a device for aggregating disperse information, as Hayek (1945) famously put it, but that it can go much further and serve as a means for distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995) . That is, a way that allows market participants to think collectively about the issue. markets are in some ways shaped by deliberate anonymity. What, then, is the counterpart of embeddedness when the only actor that a trader sees is through a screen?
Beyond embeddedness, the social can also be construed as a process of institutionalized belief formation. In this sense, the sociological notion of self-fulfilling prophecy offers a crucial analytical first step. As Robert K. Merton (1968) observed in his analysis of a run on a bank, economic activity can be social despite being anonymous. Banking, according to Merton, is a special form of activity in that it is subject to positive feedback between beliefs and behavior -that is, to self-fulfilling prophecies. Because a depositor's decision to draw out his or her funds reduces the liquidity available to other depositors, the collective perceptions of a bank's solvency among its different depositors end up sealing the fate of the bank.
Merton's account, however, needs to be reformulated to fit a modern context of models and financial technology. In the standard Mertonian setup, self-fulfilling prophecies entail an over-abstracted, almost tautological portrait of how crises happen. If a sufficiently large number of depositors fear a crisis, the run on the bank will surely happen. But as Callon (2007) asks, how do these beliefs arise in the first place? One answer might be that these beliefs are a shared convention. But this poses the additional question of how depositors coordinate their views around a given convention in the first place.
The answer, Callon suggests, points to the material basis of belief formation. A line forming outside a retail bank branch can be enough to prompt fears of a bank run, but the line itself is manifestly material -a systematic formation of human bodies, positioned on the sidewalk of the street and in full display for the rest of the city. In more advanced forms of financial activity, financial models could be one such form of belief coordination. In this respect, the application to markets of the analytic tools of Science and Technology Studies (STS) offers useful guidance. To understand anonymous transactions, argue Callon and his colleagues, i we must analyze the materiality of calculation, including financial models (Callon, 1998 (Callon, , 2007a . Models frame decisions and quantify alternatives, thereby exerting a mediating role on financial valuation.
Technology and cognitive interdependence
Callon's work has thus focused the debate on the problem of calculation. As he demonstrated, allowing for the role of technology in economic decision-making calls for accepting that market devices allow actors to enter the type of quantitative engagement that economists posit in their models. Callon's (1998) early emphasis on materiality focused on the tools, attributing an actor's ability to calculate to the separation ("disentanglement") between the transacting parties and the economic object being exchanged. This had the advantage of explaining how actors are able to calculate with complete independence from each other: the device replaces social cues. But it had the disadvantage of failing to provide a theory of how market actors might rely on each other, as it focused on actors acting in complete independence.
In subsequent work, Callon has outlined the ways in which the social and material come together. Callon (2008) argues that decision-making is not purely driven by the calculative device, but also by interaction with other actors in a heterogeneous network of humans, tools and other elements. Thus for instance, supermarkets offer a calculative device of sorts -a shopping cart, which allows consumers to ascertain the physical volume taken up by their purchases. But there is a social aspect that complements the tool: equipped with a mobile phone, shoppers can also include in their calculations the judgment of others in their personal network. This entails a critical move away from a tool-centered (in Callon's language: "prosthetic") view of decision-making, and towards one in which the actor is supported ("habilitated") by a network of people and things. Callon refers to this new perspective on market actors as "homo economicus 2.0." Extending Callon's new mix of the social and the material to the case of financial markets, we ask: What happens when traders use devices that bring other traders' opinions to bear on their calculations? We then go on to explore a further question: Once social dynamics are introduced in calculative decision-making, do the dysfunctions of society also enter into the calculations?
In attempting this redefinition of "the social," we draw on Knorr-Cetina's (2005) notion of scopes, or observational instruments. Knorr-Cetina draws a distinction between network-centered and scope-centered markets. In the former, personal relations carry the burden of coordination ("network architectures"). In the latter, objects are the central coordinating device. The actions of investors are projected onto a scope, creating a representation that investors can react to. Their reactions, in turn, become part of this representation. Investors do not react to each other, but to the aggregate traces of each other's actions --as seen on the scope. Such new rules of association -aggregation, anonymity, and mediation through shared representation -offer fertile grounds to theorize the ways in which risk can originate in financial models. But the full benefits of scoping only accrue to those traders that combine the market device with a body of codified knowledge (i.e., a model) that turn this new representations into an input for decision making that non-quantitative rivals do not have at their disposal. This is, in many ways, the context explored by Beunza & Stark (2004) in their ethnography of a derivatives trading room. Their study begins to explore the distinct organizational properties of quantitative finance. Thanks to models, databases and electronic data, arbitrageurs can see opportunities that they otherwise would not be able to detect. The traders' reliance on such specialized instruments, however, entails a serious risk: in bringing some information into sharp attention, the software and the graphic representations on their screens also obscure other equally important information. Beunza & Stark (2004) analyze the organizational mechanism that traders deploy to minimize this risk. Each desk in the trading room had developed its own way of looking at the market; by clustering all the desks in the same open-plan space --and especially by putting in place integrative organizational policies that ensure the flow of knowledge across desks-the traders improved their understanding of the limits of their models. But while successful at analyzing both the organizational and technical aspects of the market, Beunza & Stark (2004) Neither do the authors explore this dynamic in subsequent work. For instance, MacKenzie's (2006) analysis of Long Term Capital's debacle in 1998 turns to a traditional conceptualization of "the social," in the form of imitation following personal ties. Specifically, he explains the social dimension of the 1998 crisis as the result of "consensus trades," that is, institutionalized trading strategies that arose from social interaction among investors. Yet financial models, we contend, create a distinct form of interdependence that needs to be understood in its own terms. Once traders rely on anonymous competitors for crucial insight, a novel mechanism of social influence has been created. What potential pitfalls does it pose?
By contrast, MacKenzie's (2010a) analysis of the 2008 credit crisis is more in line with our socio-technical perspective. In it, MacKenzie focuses on the organizational aspect of valuation. The reckless mortgage lending that characterized the credit crisis, he argues, can be partly attributed to the lack of integration within rating agencies. Mortgage traders, traditionally specialized in asset-backed securities, drew on different knowledge sets, tools and techniques than those used by derivatives traders, traditionally specialized in collateralized debt obligations. The rise of mortgage-based derivatives, which combined the two spheres of activity, called for an integration of these two evaluation practices. But they were kept separate in the rating agencies, opening the door to questionable valuations. MacKenzie's (2010a) study is thus exemplary in demonstrating that a faulty organization of modeling constitutes a pitfall in quantitative finance. It also illustrates the dangers of ignoring the integrative bank management policies outlined by Beunza & Stark (2004) . However, MacKenzie's article says little about the interplay between models and sociality outside the organization. It is to this problem that we turn in our study.
RESEARCH METHODS
Research site. The data reported below are taken from our observations of the merger arbitrage desk at pseudonymous International Securities, a global bank with an active proprietary trading unit. The bank was among the world's ten largest in equity underwriting (Hoffman, 2006) . Our observations center on its equity derivatives trading room, located in Lower Manhattan. Proprietary trading units of this kind function as internal hedge funds within an investment bank, that is, they trade with the bank's capital rather than the client's, making their activity potentially riskier but also more lucrative.
Arbitrage constitutes an ideal site to examine models and their risks because arbitrage played a central role in many recent financial crises. These include the market crash of 1987, the crisis of Long Term Capital in 1998, and the hedge fund "mini-crash" of August 2007 (see respectively Dunbar, 2000; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003; Lowenstein 2000; Jorion, 2004; MacKenzie, 2006; Khandani & Lo, 2007) . Of the different trading strategies pursued by arbitrageurs, our study centers on merger arbitrage. This focus on mergers allows us to identify financial failure, as it allows us to separate the perceptions of financial actors on Wall Street from the actual events that unfold outside it.
Unlike other arbitrage strategies such as convergence trades, merger arbitrage is an "event-driven" strategy. It boils down to informed speculation about a specific eventthe completion of a corporate merger. The implication is that our traders are not simply monitoring the positions of others in order to anticipate "where the crowd is moving." Rather, they do so to derive the expectations of other traders about the likelihood of an event -the merger -that will, in the end, happen or not happen. And that event, the merger, is by and large independent of the collective wagers of the arbitrage community (although there is debate on this point -see Larcker & Lys, 1987; Corelli & Li, 2002; Hsieh & Walkling, 2005) . Thus, the specific form of specularity involved in merger arbitrage differs from Keynes' (1936) view of financial markets as beauty pageants (see Dupuy 1989) in that arbitrageurs can collectively be wrong. This makes merger arbitrage ideal to understand financial crises.
We explore the role of models in merger arbitrage with a combination of ethnography and historical sociology. Our ethnography entailed a three-year engagement with the bank, extending to more than sixty visits between the Fall 1999 and the Spring of 2003. We complement our observations with a historical reconstruction of an arbitrage trade that ended up in disaster. On June 2001, a decision by the European Commission led to the forced cancellation of the GEHoneywellmerger,imposinglossesof$2.9billionon the merger arbitrage community. International Securities was involved in this trade, and lost six million in it. Using interviews and other historical data, we reconstruct what happened with this trade in light of the mechanism that we identified during our ethnographic observation.
Our combination of ethnography and historical sociology offers a powerful probe. Ethnography is particularly useful to understand the complexities of financial modeling, for it places the researcher in the same position of uncertainty about the future that his or her subjects experience, thereby avoiding the danger of retrospectively underestimating uncertainty (Orlikowsky, 1992; Barley, 1986; Agar, 1986; Spradley, 1979) . Partly for that reason, ethnography has been a method of choice in the social studies of finance literature (Abolafia, 1996; Knorr-Cetina & Bruegger, 2002; Zaloom, 2003; Beunza & Stark, 2004) . Our study combines ethnography observation with historical sociology. The examination of GE-Honeywell allows us to focus on a specific instance where merger arbitrage became problematic and potentially disastrous. Admittedly, we were not physically in the trading room while the GE-Honeywell merger unraveled -hence our treatment of it as historical sociology. But our ethnography provided us with access to the key traders who suffered the losses, as well as unique interpretation of the event based on the sociotechnical dynamics that we did observe first-hand. Just as Vaughan (1996) was able to effectively reconstruct the Challenger disaster without being present at Cape Kennedy on the day of the accident, our research design did not find us on the trading floor on the very day of the arbitrage disaster --but we were there on multiple other occasions, both before and after.
Our mixed methods approach offers an important advantage. By providing a symmetrical treatment of success and failure, our study avoids the trappings of the sociology of error (Bloor 1976) , in which "the social" is only seen as the source of dysfunctional behavior. Thus, whereas models of herding and information cascades only consider the negative aspects of social interaction, our study explains disasters in the same way that it explains extraordinary success.
REFLEXIVE MODELING AT A MERGER ARBITRAGE DESK
Our study of modeling at a merger arbitrage desk was part of a broader ethnographic study of a derivatives trading floor on a Wall Street investment bank. Following the downfall of Long Term Capital in 1998, the over-arching goal of the study was to characterize quantitative finance in its various aspects: organizational, cultural, and economic. What were the distinct challenges of managing derivative traders? How was the profession experienced by its practitioners? What was the rationale for the outsized returns (and bonuses) enjoyed by them?
Our journey into the trading room eventually took us to the merger arbitrageurs. We started the project by focusing on the manager of the trading room. We soon learnt that social interaction in the trading room was very different from traditional open outcry in financial exchanges: information technology and modern trading (arbitrage) had transformed trading rooms into more silent and intellectual spaces. We continued by seeking to understand arbitrage, interviewing the heads of various desks that comprised the trading floor -merger arbitrage, options arbitrage, index arbitrage, etc. We soon realized that we would only be able to understand quantitative techniques by engaging in detailed observation at one desk. We chose the merger arbitrage desk for three reasons. First, it employed a distinctly quantitative strategy (post-announcement trading) that was considerably evolved from the over-socialized practices of insider trading that brought down Ivan Boesky in the 1980s. Second, the merger desk was one of the most respected and profitable ones in the trading room. And third, the head of the merger desk was regarded as a world-class expert the industry. In the following account we report our findings from data gathered on the morning of detailed observation of merger arbitrage, March 27th, 2003. However, the analysis of these data draws on observations from all three years of fieldwork.
Setting up the trade
Our morning of observation started at 9:00 am on March 27, 2003, minutes before the US markets opened. We found the arbitrageurs sitting at the merger desk, working quietly at their computers. Oswald, the junior analyst among the three, was absorbed in a succession of PowerPoint slides on his screen, isolated from the others by a pair of headphones. Max and Anthony, senior and junior traders respectively, were entering data from a sheet of paper into Excel spreadsheets. They worked in parallel to prevent clerical mistakes. As they typed, their conversation turned to data about other ongoing trades. "What's your price for Whitman?" asked one of them. "I've got bad data on it."
An important merger had just been announced. Career Education Corporation, a private provider of vocational training based in Illinois, had stated its intention to acquire Whitman Education Group, a Miami-based competitor. The news had landed on the Bloomberg terminals of the traders at 5:58 pm of the previous day, with the market already closed. The arbitrageurs confronted the news on the following morning, minutes before our visit.
The traders were reacting to the merger announcement in their characteristic way, preparing a trade. The first step in this process was the elaboration of a memorandum. The memo summarized the key details of the Whitman-Career combination. Oswald compiled the memo after listening to the presentation that the merging companies put out for analysts; hence his headphones. The output of his work was a document stating the legal details of the merger: the cash and stock that Career would pay for Whitman, the expected closing date, etc.
Preparing the trade entailed a further step. The traders proceeded by codifying the document into an Excel spreadsheet, known as the "Trading Summary." This functioned as a brief of all the trades in which the desk was involved. On the morning of May 27th the traders were active in 31 deals, so the involvement in Career-Whitman meant the addition of a 32nd row to the document. On the rightmost column of the Trading Summary, single words such as "Judge", "Chinese," "Justice approves," or "watch," remind traders of the key aspect of the deal that they need to follow. Like the instrumentation panel of an aircraft, the Trading Summary made all financial action readily visible at a glance.
These early observations underscore the importance of quantitative infrastructure in modern finance. A merger trade requires the assembly of electronic scaffolding to supplement the arbitrageurs' mental processes: a PowerPoint presentation, followed by a Word memorandum, followed by an Excel spreadsheet, all of it condensed into a single live cell on a Trading Summary. In short, cognition is distributed at the merger arbitrage desk. Like the pilots and ship crew studied by Hutchins and colleagues (Hutchins & Klausen, 1996; Hutchins,1995) , arbitrageurs can reduce their cognitive overload -the extent of their bounded rationality -by turning to the machines and instruments around them. Arbitrageurs are aware and understand this process, and refer to it as "setting up" the trade.
This first vignette also points to an important cultural trait at the merger arbitrage desk. The arbitrageurs, and Max especially, were keenly aware of the disastrous potential of mistakes, hence the routine of entering data in parallel. More generally, Max illustrates the cultural transformation on Wall Street induced by the introduction of models and information technology: an appreciation for factual accuracy, and accompanying attitude of scientific detachment. For example, on hearing us use the term "buy a stock," Max winced and corrected us. He remarked:
We don't say that. The most obvious thing that differentiates the professional from the amateur is that you talk about how you are positioned towards the stock--you are short or long. But you don't 'own it,' with the commitment that it implies. It is much more dispassionate, professional, even-handed.
In other words, Max practices a distant form of economic engagement, and deems it a mark of professionalism.
A related trait of Max is his resolute drive to arrive at solutions on his own. This manifested itself, for instance, as conflict with the manager of the trading room over the location of the merger desk. Aware of the possibility for synergy across trading desks, the manager rotated the position of some desks within the room, and encouraged communication between people. But this clashed with Max's penchant for arriving to solutions on his own, especially when the manager proposed locating the merger traders near the sales desk. As the manager said, Max did not want to be near the sales force, guys who are trying to sell merger trades to the clients, yakking away it's gonna happen, it's gonna happen. He did not want that to influence him.
Max, we conclude, does not have the habitus of a trader inclined to follow the herd.
Taking a position
Amidst the hubbub of the data entry, the arbitrageurs sized up the nature of the newly announced merger. Categories, analogies, and other references to the past allowed them to engage in pattern recognition that would lead them to take a position. At 9:40 am, for instance, Max and Oswald engaged in a dialogue about Whitman and Career. "Do they have regulatory approval?" asked Max, without taking his eyes off the screen. "They do," Oswald replied, looking at his spreadsheet. "Do they have accreditation?" Max inquired. "What schools are these, anyways?" Max added emphatically, his eyes squinting at his screen. "Technical, for adults" Oswald responded. "They teach you things such as how to be dentist assistant," he remarked.
The conversation was an effective first step in sizing up the probability of merger completion. This probability is the figure that arbitrageurs care about most. The basic principle of modern arbitrage is to exploit mispricings across markets. These situations arise when two different regimes of value coexist in ambiguity (Beunza & Stark, 2004) , and merger arbitrage is no exception. In the case of mergers, the ambiguity arises from the fact that a company is being bought. The acquiring firm typically buys the target company at a price well above its market capitalization, leading to two possible valuations: if the merger is completed, the price of the company will rise up to its merger value; if it is not, the price will drop back to the level before the merger announcement or lower. Arbitrageurs exploit the ambiguity as to which of the two will apply by speculating on the probability of merger completion. To the arbitrageurs, therefore, profiting from mergers boils down to successfully estimating a probability.
In their exchange, Max and Oswald established a set of facts that subsequently proved relevant to establish this probability. For instance, they established that the merged company, if completed, would belong to the "for-profit post-secondary education sector." The usefulness of this categorization became clear at 9:45 am, as Max turned to examine a chart of Whitman's sales. "Is it true that there's a summer drop-off in this business?" he asked Oswald, faced with what appeared to be weak summer sales. This mattered, because a common source of merger failure is negative results at one of the merging companies. But there was no reason to worry. "It's the summer recess," Oswald replied. The weakness in sales was due to the school holidays -a normal part of the education industry. Because the companies belonged to the education industry, the cyclical dropoffs in sales were not a relevant merger risk. Categorizing Career and Whitman, we conclude, helped arbitrageurs interpret information that could have material implications for merger completion.
Arbitrageurs complement categorizations with analogies to past mergers. At 9:50 am, the conversation involved a discussion of another company in the for-profit education sector. "This guy Edison," Max explained, "a few years ago wanted to manage the primary school system. But then went down in flames. Pressingacombinationofcommandskeys,MaxobtainedinformationonEdisonto look for patterns that were similar to the Whitman-Career deal. The screen correspondedtoaproprietarydatabasethatMaxhasmeticulouslyassembledover the years, with information about all past mergers in which the desk had been involved,classifiedalongnumerousdimensions.Thisgives"thumbnail"information abouteachcompanythatmerged."Youthinkyouwouldremember,"Maxsaid,"but youdon't.Memoryisverydeceiving."Liketheotherarbitrageartefactspresented above, the database contributes to distribute cognition at the trading desk. Specifically, by providing a costless system of storage and retrieval of past information,thedatabasehelpedarbitrageursmobilizepastdealstomakesenseof currentones.
After two hours of establishing associations, the arbitrageurs were beginning to developanoverallimpressionoftheWhitman-Careermerger.Maxexplained,There may be many issues with this company, but I can invest right away by knowing that they're a $5 million company and a $2 million company.Thismeansit'snotonecompanyacquiringanotherthat'sthe samesize,whichrightawaymeansthattherearenotfinancingissues involved.Iftherewere,itwouldbeawholedifferentgame. As the quotation shows, Max was optimistic: even though the industry -for-profit education-wastaintedbyapastscandal,thetraderswerestillencouragedbythe lackofotherobstacles. At10:15am,themarketopenedonWhitmanEducationwithapriceof$13.95.The arbitrageurs' spreadsheets showed the spread to be a generous ten percent, signaling to the traders a potential opportunity. "I'd like to have a presence in the deal," said Max almost immediately. "Let's bid $13.60 for 10,000" he added. Following the instruction, Anthony lifted the headset from his phone turret and called the block trader to place an order. Thus, barely two hours after starting to workonthedeal,themergertradersatInternationalSecuritieshadtakenaposition intheWhitman-Careermerger. Why take a position within minutes of the opening? Arbitrage, we observed, is a gameofspeed.Thelongerarbitrageurstaketoadoptaposition,themoretimetheir competitors have to seize the opportunity before them. As in Occam's razor, arbitrageurstakeintoaccountasmanyfactorsastheyneedtotakeaposition,but not more. Taking a position thus involves a successive winnowing of the possible contingenciesinvolvedinthemergerasthearbitrageursthinkthroughthedeal.The traderswalkthroughaformofmentaldecisiontree,inwhicheachspecificmerger is considered in relation to similar deals that they encountered in the past. Max explains, "it's almost like you've been in this road before and [the past incidents] directyou."Theadvantageofthissystem,whichMaxdescribesasa"process-driven arbitrage,"isthatnumerousissuesneednotbetakenintoaccount.Arbitrageisfast, light,anddeploysresourcesinastrategicmanner. Thearbitrageurs,therefore,arenotsimplyperformingaroutinetaskofrecognition -classifyingmergersintopre-existingcategories-butafarmoreactivetaskofrecognition. That is, they are changing, expanding, and going beyond the existing categoricalstructuretoascertainthekeymergerobstaclesinagivendeal.
Representing the collective rival
Our analysis so far has established that the arbitrageurs deploy sophisticated quantitative tools. But as we shall see, no matter how sophisticated their tools, arbitrageursareacutelyawarethattheirmodelsarefallible.Tradersconfronttheir own fallibility by distancing themselves from the categories and procedures that guided them to an initial position. This, however, is easier said than done. Mental awarenessofthelimitsofone'sviewdoesnotautomaticallyprovideacheckagainst theselimits.Traders,wefoundout,gaincognitivedistancefromtheircategoriesby exploitingthefactthatotherarbitrageurshavealsotakenpositionsonthistrade.It is to the second moment of a distributed cognition -across a socio-technical networkoutsidethetradingroom-thatweturn. At 10:30 am, the conversation between Max, Oswald, and Anthony shifted from Career and Whitman to another ongoing merger. Five months before our morning visit,HongKongandShanghaiBank(HSBC)hadannounceditsintentiontoacquire HouseholdInternational,anAmericanbankspecializedinsubprimemortgages.The tradersatthemergerdeskhadbeen"playing"thisdeal. At 10:40 am Max typed a command in his Bloomberg terminal, producing a large black and blue graph on his screen. The chart, reproduced in Figure 1 below, displays the evolution of the "spread" between HSBC and Household. The spread amountstothedifferenceinthepricesofthemergingcompanies,adjustedforthe terms of the merger. In this case the spread corresponded to the difference in the prices of HSBC and Household over the five-month period in which the merger unfolded, weighted by the stock conversion ratio agreed by the merging partners: 0.535sharesinHSBCforeachshareinHouseholdInternational. Visualizingmergerlikelihood.Thegraph,knownasthe"spreadplot,"playsakeyrole intheworkofthetraders.Movementsinthespreadsignalchangesinthelikelihood ofmergercompletion.Ifamergeriscompletedandthetwomergingfirmsbecomea singleentity,thedifferenceintheirstockprices-thespread-willdisappear.Thus, arbitrageurs interpret a narrowing of the spread as a sign that other arbitrageurs collectively assign a greater likelihood of merger completion. Conversely, if the mergeriscanceledandtheequivalencebetweenthetwofirmsceasestoapply,the spread will revert to its wider level before the merger announcement. Thus, arbitrageurs interpret a widening spread as a sign that other arbitrageurs collectivelyassignalowerlikelihoodofmergercompletion. Using the spreadplot in this manner involves semiotic sophistication. In this complexsystemofsigns(Peirce1998;Muniesa2007),thespreadplotprovideseach trader an indirect sign of the likelihood of the merger, achieved by signaling the aggregateofhisorherrivals'assessmentofthatlikelihood.Fortheveryreasonthat they are deeply proprietary, the trader does not have access to the proprietary databasesthroughwhichparticularotherrivalsconstructedtheirownindependent probability estimates. And indeed, to have such access would result in cognitive overload:howcouldonegaincognitivedistancefromone'sownmodelsifonehad to engage in the time-consuming task of comparing them with those of dozens of other traders? The spreadplot reduces that cognitive complexity by representing theaggregateoftheexpectationsofothertraders. Thearbitragetrader,however,isnotinterestedinthespreadplotasasignofwhat othersaredoinginthemarket.Theyreadthespreadasasignofaneventthatwill orwillnothappenintheworld-themerger.Thepromisingaspectofthissignis thatitisquasi-independentofatrader'sownestimatesoftheprobabilityofmerger. Thearbitragetraderisnotatechnicaltraderwho,likethefashionistawhomonitors otherstoanticipatethehottestclubs,seekstoprofitbyanticipatingmarkettrends. Instead, arbitrageurs use the movements of their rivals as a check on their own independentopinion,ratherthanasubstituteforit. The HSBC-Household merger illustrates how the spreadplot helps traders identify potentialobstaclestomergercompletion(seechartonFigure1).Thechartshows two clear spikes along a descending line. These correspond to instances in which marketparticipantslostconfidenceinthemerger.Thefirst,onNovember22,2002, wasinspiredbyfundingconcerns:wasHSBCafinanciallyunsoundcompany,simply buyingHouseholdtogetfunding?Thissurgeinthespreadsubsidedafterageneral market rally. The second spike took place on March 20, 2003, following news that Household International was shredding documents. This reminded arbitrageurs of similar shredding at Enron years before. The spread then fell again after the company received its approval from the financial authorities, and once HSBC reassured investors. The two spikes illustrate how plotting the spread brings into relief potential merger obstacles. Had the arbitrageurs not consulted the spread plot,theseconcernsmighthaveremainedunexplored--anabandonedbranchinthe traders'tree-likedecisionpattern. Checkingthespreadplot,then,isawaytoavoid theproblemofcognitivelock-inidentifiedbyDavid(1985 )andArthur(1989 .
Translatingpricesintoprobabilities.Inusingthespreadplot,akeyconceptusedby the arbitrageurs is the "implied probability" of a merger. By implied, the arbitrageurs refer to the probability of merger completion that rival arbitrageurs assign to the merger. Quantifying this probability entails manipulating the basic regularitygoverningarbitrage,theLawofOnePrice,inaprocessknownas"backing out." The core idea behind this concept is that it is possible to extract useful informationfrommispricingsinmarketswherearbitrageursarepresent (Cox,Ross & Rubinstein, 1979; Harrison & Kreps, 1979) . As the Law of One Price argues, the presence of arbitrageurs eliminates unjustifiable differences in prices across markets. (For instance, in the absence of transportation costs, the price of gold in London would not systematically differ from that of gold in New York without inviting the activity of arbitrageurs.) Once unjustifiable differences are arbitraged away, the difference in prices between New York and London that remain can be interpreted as the cost of transportation. Thus, by assuming that the Law of One Priceapplies,arbitrageurscantransformpricedifferencesintousefulinformation. Merger arbitrageurs apply this idea to corporate mergers. When a merger is announced and arbitrageurs are active on a stock, the stock price of the merger targetshouldreflecttheexpectedmergervalue.Andifthepaymentforthemerger involves the stock of the acquirer, this value will itself be a function of the stock price of the acquirer. Thus, the difference in prices between the two stocks -the spread-canbereadasameasureoftheuncertaintythatarbitrageursassigntothe merger. In this sense, backing out is an indirect form of observation, in which the focal observerislookingatotherobservers.Considerthedecisiontocarryanumbrella towork.Lookingfromone'sapartmentwindowandseeingamostlyclearsky,one mightdecideitunnecessarytoprepareforrain.Butifoneglancedbelowandfound pedestrians carrying folded umbrellas, one would deduce that others expect an impending storm, and perhaps check the weather websites for it. Similarly, arbitrageurs check for unexpected merger obstacles by monitoring the aggregate actionsoftheirrivals.Dissonancecanpromptdoubt,stimulatingadditionalsearch forwhatmighthavebeenmissingininitialassessments. Backing out probabilities, however, can only be done under certain conditions. In accomplishing the translation from prices to probabilities, arbitrageurs make two keyassumptions:first,theyassumethatmovementsinthespreadaredominatedby mergerconsiderations.Conversely,ifthespreadchangedforsomereasonunrelated to the merger, the interpretation of the move as a change in merger likelihood would be erroneous. Second, the translation assumes that markets equilibrate rapidly. For that reason, unless rival arbitrageurs have seen the relevant prices, compared them to their own information and acted upon it, the spread will not conveytheirprivateknowledge.Asweshallsee,arbitrageursaremindfulofthese twoconditionsandcomebacktothemrepeatedlywheneverpricesdonotbehavein anunderstandablemanner.
Gaining distance
"Arewemissingsomething?"By12:00pm,thespreadbetweenWhitmanandCareer remainedatthesamewidemarginitdisplayedtwohoursbefore,tenpercent.Early on,atenpercentspreadsignaledanopportunity.Butitspersistenceposedapuzzle forthetraders,foritcouldnowbeinterpretedverydifferently.Itcouldmean,first, that other professional arbitrageurs were not "playing" the deal because they perceived problems that could derail the merger. Alternatively, the wide spread couldmeanthereverseofathreat:abetter-than-expectedopportunity."Canitbe," Max asked, "that the deal has gone under the radar screen of other traders?" The persistently wide spread, in short, was an ambiguous signal: it could be signaling incorrectmodeling,oraprofitopportunity.Establishingwhichoftheseappliedwas crucialtothetraders.Thespread,inotherwords,wasawake-upcallthatprompted arbitrageurstothinktwice. Theconundrumfacedbythetraderswassymptomaticofthedisruptiveroleofthe spreadplot. Arbitrageurs, the chart reminded them, should not blindly trust their probabilityestimates,becauseithingesonarepresentationofthemerger--derived fromadatabase--thatcouldbeincorrect.Thedatabasecouldhaveinaccuratedata, the wrong analogy, or a missing field. Given this, the spreadplot provides traders withamuch-neededdevicefordoubt:bydisplayingtheirdegreeofdeviationfrom theconsensus,itprovidesarbitrageurswithtimelyredflags. Responding to dissonance. Max and his colleagues responded to the discordant spreadbyplungingintoasearchforpossiblemergerobstaclesthattheymightnot have anticipated. "Are we missing something," Max asked the traders. The traders firstturnedtodatabases:at12.10pm,oneofthemtypedthenames"Whitman"and "Career" on an online proprietary database. Like a Google keyword search, the databasepresentedthemwithseveralhitsrankedbyrelevance.Skimmingthrough thesourcesofeachresult,thetraderwasreassuredtoseefamiliarnewspapers.The search,then,didnotproduceanythingtheydidnotknowinadvance. Thedatabasesearchisaninstanceofthewayinwhicharbitrageursrespondtothe discrepancy induced by the spreadplot. Having observed the dissonance between theirownprobabilityestimatesandtheimpliedprobability,thetraderswentback to search for missing information. In doing this, the database helped even though thetradershardlyknewwhattheywerelookingfor:byincludingnewsfromlocal media that the national media might have overlooked, it provided leads for issues thatneedtobedugdeeper.
Thetraders'approachcontrastswithearlyneo-institutionalistviewsofmarkets.In theclassicaccount,theavailabilityofsocialcluesleadsactorstoeconomizeontheir searchcostsbyimitatingothers (Meyer&Rowan,1978; DiMaggio&Powell,1983) . In contrast, knowledge of the spread stimulated the arbitrageurs to search more. The discrepancy illustrates an important point about arbitrage. The material tools allow traders to come up with more sophisticated answers than traditional investors precisely by inducing skepticism about the tools. Arbitrageurs, in this sense,arepersistentbutskepticalusersofcalculativedevices.
Recourse to the network. Following the inconclusive search on Whitman, the arbitrageurs got on the telephone. At 12:20 pm, Anthony lifted the headset of his phone turret and called the floor broker who handled orders for Whitman at the exchange."JohnsaysbuythisWIX[forWhitman],noone'sreallyhedgingit,"hesaid to Max as he finished the conversation. No other arbitrageur, the floor broker implied,wasactiveintheWhitmantrade.Fromthis,Maxconcludedthatthemerger hadpassed"undertheradarscreen"ofotherarbitrageurs.Hereactedbyincreasing the desks' exposure to the merger. "Let's work another ten [thousand] , but pick your spots" he said to Anthony, asking the junior trader to purchase additional sharesinWhitman,buttodosocarefullytoavoidinflatingthestockprice. Why did the arbitrageurs call up their contacts? Until 12:00 pm, the traders had interpreted the spread as the implied probability of the merger. The persistent discrepancybetweenthewidespreadandthetraders'estimates,however,createda dissonance that led them to question their own interpretation. Having re-checked the database, they decided to inquire about the identities of the shareholders, partially lifting the veil of anonymity that protects securities trading. In doing so, the arbitrageurs were seeking to clarify whether backing out made sense in this context:wasthespreadreflectingtheinformationinthehandsofrivalarbitrageurs? Thetradersconcludeditwasnot. Thetraders,however,wereemphaticallynotmimickingtheirrivals.Theirswasnot a case of classic isomorphism or herding. Instead, they were attempting to disentangleoverallmarketmovementsfromtheactionsoftheplayerswho,intheir view,weretheonlyoneswhoreallycounted:theirrivals,namely,otherprofessional arbitrageurs. On learning that no other real player was hedging the stock, they concluded that the spread could not be interpreted as a measure of implied probability.Theredflag,oncloserinspection,turnedouttobeagreenlight.Thus, reflexivityatthemergerarbitragedeskcutsbothways:whereasanhourearlierthe spreadplot had led Max and his team to raise doubts about their database, their subsequent phone conversation stimulated doubts about the meaning of the spreadplot,thedevicefordoubtitself. In light of the above, consider now why Max told Anthony "pick your spots." The expressionremindedAnthonytocoverhistracksasheincreasedthedesks'position on Whitman, with the aim of avoiding an increase in its stock price. The traders' efforts suggest that Max and colleagues felt they were being observed by other arbitrageursthroughthelensofthespread.JustasMaxandhisteamengagedina calculatedgameofguessing,sowererivalarbitrageursatotherfirms.Preservingan opportunity that had gone "under the radar screen" of rival traders required avoidingwarningcompetitors.ii Reflexive modeling. The developments described above suggest that the traders' caution unfolds as the confrontation between two related magnitudes. A trader's ability to mobilize prices for greater precaution hinges on the encounter between the probability of the merger (estimated at the desk) and implied probability (derivedfromthespreadplot).Thiscomparisonprovidesaninvaluableadvantage:it signals to traders the extent of their deviation from the market, warns against missing information, motivates additional search, prompts them to activate their businesscontacts,andprovidesthenecessaryconfidencetoexpandtheirpositions. Thisdistinctiveinterplayofinternalandexternalestimatespointstoanoveluseof economicmodels,whichwerefertoasreflexivemodeling.Theexpressiondenotes theprocesswherebydispersedmarketactorsemployeconomicmodelstoconfront theirownestimates.Thisconfrontationpitsatrader'sestimatesagainstthoseofhis or her rivals, thereby introducing dissonance in his or her calculations. This dissonance is attained through the construction of implied probability. This variable is a representation of an economic object that does not have a price, is otherwisenotobservable,andisco-producedbythepositioningofactorswhouseit to confront their interpretations and re-evaluate their positions. Collectively produced, the implied probability is a device for dissonance. Reflexive modeling thus denotes a heightened awareness on the part of the arbitrageurs about the limits of their own representations of the economy. The literature in the social studies of finance has already identified other instances of backing out. Thus, for example, options traders manipulate Black-Scholes to arrive at implied volatility (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003) . And bond traders use implied interest rates (Zaloom, 2009) . In short, the use of models in reverse to develop estimates of market consensusisnotspecifictomergerarbitrage.
Frompersonalnetworkstofinancialmodels.Theuseofthespreadisatellingsignof the calculative orientation of the arbitrageurs. Up until the late 1980s, merger arbitrageursfocusedonanticipatingthemergerannouncementbypursuingrumors fromthenetworksofthetraders.Currently,however,arbitrageurscentertheirbets onmergercompletion,whichcanbeanticipatedwiththemodelingtoolsdescribed above, namely, the spreadplot and implied probability. Thus, whereas the typical strategies of investors traditionally entailed accessing information ahead of their competitors (Abolafia,1996) ,mergerarbitrageursbasetheiradvantageonfinancial models. These models have given arbitrageurs enough precision to access profit opportunitiesthatdidnotexistbefore.
Max emphasized this important shift with an example. "Look at this jump," he said, in reference to the brusque price movement of Household International on the day its merger with HSBC was announced (see Figure 2 below ). He added, This is the value that the [mutual] fund managers and the guys on the street are after. Once the jump has taken place, it's a matter of pennies. The value investors don't have the fine-tuned tools to position themselves in this spread, to determine if it's too wide or too narrow for them. We do.
Thus, the arbitrageurs eschew the fat margins that can be found by correctly anticipating the merger announcement, and only trade once the deal is officially announced.Thenarrowmarginstobeobtainedoncetheannouncementismadeare opentothem,thankstotheprecisionoftheirquantitativetechniques.Indeed,this shiftinstrategywasnotonlymotivatedbytheavailabilityoftoolsbutalsobythe dangers involved in relying on rumors and privileged information. The indictment of merger arbitrageur Ivan Boesky in 1986 on charges of insider trading discouraged the rest of the arbitrage community from exploiting privileged informationaboutunannouncedmergers. Inlinewiththislong-runningshiftfromrumorstomodels,thetradershavecometo see nuanced interpretation, rather than raw information, as the source of their advantage. When asked about the reason for the disparity between their own assessment of merger probability and the merger spread, Max argued that it stemmedfromadifferentialinterpretationofthedata.Hesaid,
The reason why the spread is large is that other traders have their own proprietary models for it. And they can all be right. At this point, it's all about the future, and we don't know the future. So their assumptions on volatility, for example, could be different than ours. Or their assumptions about timing.
TheopportunitythatMaxsaw,then,wasnottheresultofprivilegedinformation.As Max said, "right now, the data is all on the Internet, even the SEC filings." Being widely available, information does not confer any advantage. To him, it resulted fromhisdesks'distinctinterpretationofpubliclyavailabledata. Ouraccountsofarpresentsthebrightsideoffinancialmodels.Thankstoreflexive modeling, arbitrageurs have increased the accuracy of their estimates, gaining access to new opportunities while reducing their risk. As we shall see, however, thereisalsoadownsidetofinancialmodeling.Becausearbitrageursusemodelsto check their positions against the rest of the market, the diffusion of reflexive modelingcreatescognitiveinterdependencebetweenotherwiseindependentrivals.
RESONANCE AND COLLECTIVE FAILURE IN A MERGER ARBITRAGE TRADE
Precisely because of its cognitive benefits, reflexive modeling poses an important danger,asthispracticecanproducecollectivefailure.Thisproblembecameclearto uswhenanalyzingoneconcretecase.OnJune12,2001theEuropeanCommission stated a firm opposition to the planned merger between two large American companies. The ruling put an end to the proposed combination between General ElectricandHoneywellInternational,announcedsevenmonthsbefore.Asnewsof the ruling arrived on Wall Street, Honeywell's stock price fell by more than ten percent. The drop caused losses of more than $2.8 billion to professional arbitrageurs--thehedgefundsandinvestmentbanksthatexpectedthemergerto succeed. The magnitude of the losses was eloquently captured by the words of a Wall Street executive to the Wall Street Journal. "Obviously this has been very painful,"henoted."Thelossesaregoingtobeverybig,"headded (Sidel,2001:C1) . Events like the GE-Honeywell merger failure have received increasing attention in thefinanceliterature,andareknownas"arbitragedisasters."Anarbitragedisaster denotes a merger that is cancelled after being announced, leading to widespread losses for the arbitrageurs that bet on it. Importantly, not all merger cancellations aredisasters-onlythosethathaveadamagingimpactontheaggregatereturnsof arbitrageurs.Mergercancellationsthatarewidelyanticipatedarethusnotdisasters. Indeed,onlyfifteenmergercancellationsbetween1984and2004canbeclassified as disasters (Officer, 2007) . The GE-Honeywell merger failure was the worst accident in that period. Another important disaster was the cancelled merger betweenTellabsandCienain1998,whichimposedalossof$181milliononLong-TermCapitalandcontributedtothedownfallofthefund. Arbitrage disasters can also be seen as Black Swans. These adverse events are typically associated with the presence of surprise: arbitrageurs suffer losses when twocompaniescancelamergerthatthetradersbelievedwouldhappen.Andindeed, the history of GE-Honeywell is in many ways the history of a painful surprise --arbitrageurs did not sufficiently anticipate the danger of regulatory opposition to the merger. The merger traders had a reason to ignore it, as the antitrust authorities in the United States and Europe had always coordinated their rulings. Never before had a merger authorized in Washington been blocked in Brussels
Failed arbitrage deals, with total losses incurred by arbitrageurs (circle size) and relative participation of arbitrageurs in (y-axis). Source: Officer (2007: 27) . (Bary,2001:43) .ThisprecedentwasbrokenintheGE-Honeywelldeal.Itsleading protagonist,thefamouslyrigorousEuropeancommissionerMarioMonti,calledfora cancellationofthemergeronthegroundsthatitwouldgivethecombinedentityan abilitytoengageinanti-competitive"bundling."Giventhisunexpectedcancellation, thedisastercouldbeseenasaBlackSwan. Ouranalysis,however,suggeststhatGE-HoneywellwasneitheraBlackSwannoran information cascade. It was, we contend, an unintended consequence of reflexive modeling.ToseehowarbitrageursthoughtabouttheGE-Honeywelldeal,consider the spread between GE-Honeywell, as shown in Figure 4 . As the narrow spread shows, arbitrageurs initially assigned a very large implied probability to the completionofthemerger.Reportsfromthefinancialpressconfirmthispoint.As one arbitrageur put it to the financial press, "people had it among their larger positions because they thought there was a large probability the deal would get done"(Sidel2001:C1). Spread between GE and Honeywell (line) and media concern over EC opposition to the merger (bar). The graph shows that the surge in media concern in late February was not matched by a corresponding increase in the merger spread. Source: Bloomberg and ABI/Inform
Such high confidence had a legitimate cause. It was a direct consequence of the decision, taken by numerous arbitrage funds, not to give material weight to the dangerofEuropeanregulatoryopposition.Thiscanbededucedfromacomparison between the merger spreadplot and the media responses to the Commission's actions (see Figure 4) . The bar chart in the figure shows the number of weekly articlespublishedinthemajorbusinesspressthatincludedintheirtextthewords "Honeywell" and "Monti. Exploiting resonance. One sign that resonance is an acute problem in merger arbitrage is the existence of funds that set out to exploit it. According to the FinancialTimes,theNewYorkhedgefundAtticusGlobalhaddevelopedastrategy to exploit arbitrage disasters such as the GE-Honeywell deal (Clow, 2001 ). Atticus bet against mergers when other arbitrageurs were most confident in them. According to Clow (2001: 25) , "Most risk arbitrage managers followed their usual strategyofgoinglongthetarget,Honeywell,andshortthebuyer,GE.Atticusshorted HoneywellandboughtGE,makinga10percentreturnonitsinvestment."
COGNITIVE INTERDEPENDENCE IN QUANTITATIVE FINANCE
Theaboveanalysisshedslightonthesocio-technicalnatureofquantitativefinance. Understanding the full implications of the quantitative revolution, we found, calls foranappreciationofbothsocialandtechnologicalaspectsofmarkets-inshort,of the cognitive interdependence introduced by financial models. The mechanism of resonance proposed above posits a form of interdependence that results from the traders'useofmodelsforreflexivepurposes.
A socio-technical account of reflexivity
The reflexivity exhibited by the traders is not a mental process or a solipsistic practice.Initssimplestform,reflexivityrestsonthecontrapositionoftwomaterial artifacts -the arbitrageur's screens. The first, an Excel spreadsheet, summarizes howthetradersthinkaboutthemerger.Theso-calledTradingSummarybuildsona webofassociations,includingcategoriesandanalogies,leadinguptothekeyissue facingthedeal.Thesecondscreen,thespreadplot,issharedbyallarbitragefunds andcaptureshowcompetitorsthinkaboutthemergerbyshowingthedifferencein the prices between the merging companies. Reflexivity is made possible by the frictionbetweenthetwoscreens.Frictionofferscuesthatthearbitrageursmightbe missing a relevant obstacle to the merger. Instead of substituting search with imitation, as in mimetic isomorphism, arbitrageurs use social cues to complement theirsearch. Asapracticeofusingamodeltogaincognitivedistance,reflexivemodelingisthusa cognitive process. But it is not taking place in the heads of the traders, as if cognitioncouldbeturnedbackontoitself.Justasthecognitiveprocessofderiving their own probability estimates is socially distributed across the tools and instruments at the arbitrage desk, so reflexive cognition (Stark 2009 ) is a sociotechnicalprocessofdistributedcognitiontriggeredbythespreadplot-adevicefor dissonance that is itself a socio-technically constructed object. The traders we observedwerenotengaginginsomeheroicmentalfeat,splittingandtwistingtheir minds backon themselves like someintellectualvariantof a flexible contortionist. Instead,aswesawnumeroustimesinasinglemorningatasingletradingdesk,the taken-for-granteds of their models were cognitively disrupted by devices for dissonance.
ThenotionofreflexivemodelingadvancestheconceptofscopicmarketsbyKnorrCetina(2005).Inreflexivemodeling,themodelitselfisusedforscopicpurposes:for projectingtheactionsofothersinawaythatpromptsaction.Butinsteadofscoping theintrinsicqualitiesoftheeconomicobject-theprofitability,solvencyormerger likelihoodofapubliclylistedcompany-itfocusedinsteadonthebehaviorofother actorsinthemarket.Thisallowedtraderstoescapetheimpossiblechoicebetween models or social cues, because the model constituted the lens through which the social cues were revealed. Indeed, models even go beyond displaying social cues: they quantify them and translate the resulting number into one that is commensuratewiththelikelihoodestimatesofthemergertraders.
Reflexive modeling thus brings quantitative finance into full circle: whereas the introduction of models and information technology in the capital markets brought inanonymityandasemblanceofobjectivityinthedata,reflexivemodelingmakesit clearthattradersarenotjustmodelingtheeconomicbutalsothesocial.Although anonymous and impersonal, quantitative finance brings back the interdependence amongtheactors-andforthatreason,itssocialaspect.Butthisformofsociability aroundmodelsdoesnoteasilyfitexistingframeworksineconomicsociology-itis dissembedded yet entangled; anonymous yet collective; impersonal yet, nevertheless,emphaticallysocial.
A socio-technical account of risk
Just as reflexive modeling can be a source of correction, it can also lead to the amplificationoferror.Whenthistakesplace,financialactorsconfrontasituationof resonance. The concept of resonance contributes to economic sociology by complementing existing behavioral accounts of risk such as herding and the Black Swan. Resonance explains arbitrage disasters without the need to resort to individual biases. Instead, it explains them as the unintended consequence of a mostlyfunctionalsystem. Given this, does quantitative finance add or reduce the risk faced by market participants?Weseethisasafalsedichotomy.AsLuhmannandothersociologistsof risk have argued, risk is rarely eliminated in modern technological societies (Luhmann,1993; Beck,1992; Giddens,1990 The central contention of our analysis is that these first and second episodes are conceptually related. The cause of the GE-Honeywell arbitrage disaster, we concluded,wasamalfunctioningofthesamereflexivemechanismthatweobserved inthemergeroftheeducationcompanies.Reflexivemodelingworksbyproviding traders with dissonance whenever their estimates are different from those of the majority -and therefore, possibly mistaken. But if enough traders miss a key variable, their mistake will reverberate to the others through the implied probability. As resonance develops in the system, traders will gain a false confidencethattheirviewsarecorrect,leadingtoextraordinarylossesintheevent ofmergercancellation. Unlike most existing research, the notion of resonance reflexive modeling engages with quantitative finance by taking both social and technological factors into account. Resonance is additionally appealing in that it does not require the assumption of individual biases on the part of financial actors, whether it is unreflexiveness or a tendency to conform. On the contrary, our account is compatible with a view of individual actors as intelligent, creative, thoughtful, and independently minded. In doing so, it brings out into sharper relief the dilemma involved in the social use of financial models: their use can ameliorate financial risks,butitincreasethepotentialofevengreaterdangers.
